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1. INTRODUCTION
The theory of embodied cognition offers us new ways to think about bodies, mind, and
technology. Designing interactivity will never be the same.
The embodied conception of a tool provides a first clue of things to come. When a
person hefts a tool the neural representation of their body schema changes as they
recalibrate their body perimeter to absorb the end-point of the tool [La`davas 2002].
As mastery develops, the tool reshapes their perception, altering how they see and
act, revising their concepts, and changing how they think about things. This echoes
Marshall McLuhan’s famous line “we shape our tools and thereafter our tools shape
us” [McLuhan 1964]. A stick changes a blind person’s contact and grasp of the world;
a violin changes a musician’s sonic reach; roller-skates change physical speed, altering
the experience of danger, stride, and distance. These tools change the waywe encounter,
engage, and interact with the world. They change our minds. As technology digitally
enhances tools we will absorb their new powers. Is there a limit to how far our powers
can be increased? What are the guidelines on how to effectively alter minds?
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Consider a moment longer how coming tools will change us. On the “perception” side,
our senses will reveal hidden patterns, microscopic, telescopic, and beyond our elec-
tromagnetic range, all visualized imaginatively. On the “action” side, our augmented
control will be fine enough to manipulate with micrometer precision scalpels too small
for our genetic hands; we will drive with millisecond sensitivity vehicles big enough
to span a football field or small enough to enter an artery. Our future is prosthetic: a
world of nuanced feedback and control through enhanced interaction. These are the
obvious things.
Less obvious, though, is how new tools will redefine our lived-in world: how we will
conceptualize how and what we do. New tools make new tasks and activities possible.
This makes predicting the future almost out of reach. Designers need to understand the
dynamic between invention, conception, and cognition. It is complicated. And changing.
Good design needs good science fiction; and good science fiction needs good cognitive
science.
Consider next the role the body itself plays in cognition. This is the second clue to our
imminent future. The new theory of mind emerging over the last twenty years holds
that the physical elements of our body figure in our thought. Unimpaired humans
think with their body in ways that are impossible for the paralyzed. If true, this means
that thought is not confined to the brain; it stretches out, distributed over body and
cortex, suggesting that body parts, because of the tight way we are coupled to them,
may behave like cognitive components, partially shaping how we think.
Before the theories of embodied, situated, and distributed cognition “thinking” was
assumed to happen exclusively in the head. Voice and gesture were ways of externaliz-
ing thought but not part of creating it. Thought occurred inside; it was only expressed
on the outside. This sidelined everything outside the brain. Thus, utterance, gesture,
and bodily action were not seen as elements of thinking; they were the expression
of thought, proof that thinking was already taking place on the inside. Not really
necessary.
On newer accounts, thinking is a process that is distributed and interactive. Body
movement can literally be part of thinking. In any process, if you change one of the key
components in a functionally significant way you change the possible trajectories of the
system. Apply this to thought and it means that a significant change in body or voice
might affect how we think. Perhaps if we speak faster we make ourselves think faster.
Change our body enough and maybe we can even think what is currently unthinkable.
For instance, a new cognitive prosthesis might enable us to conceptualize things that
before were completely out of reach. And not just the 1020 digit of pi! It would be a new
way of thinking of pi; something unlike anything we can understand now, in principle.
If modern cognitive theories are right, bodies have greater cognitive consequences than
we used to believe.
This idea can be generalized beyond bodies to the objects we interact with. If a tool
can at times be absorbed into the body then why limit the cognitive to the boundaries
of the skin? Why not admit that humans, and perhaps some higher animals too, may
actually think with objects that are separate from their bodies, assuming the two,
creature and object, are coupled appropriately? If tools can be thought with, why not
admit an even stronger version of the hypothesis: that if an object is cognitively gripped
in the right way then it can be incorporated into our thinking process even if it is not
neurally absorbed? Handling an object, for example, may be part of a thinking process,
if we move it around in a way that lets us appreciate an idea from a new point of
view. Model-based reasoning, literally. Moving the object and attending to what that
movement reveals pushes us to a newmental state that might be hard to reach without
outside help.
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If it is true that we can and do literally think with physical objects, even if only for
brief moments, then new possibilities open up for the design of tangible, reality-based,
and natural computing. Every object we couple with in a cognitive way becomes an
opportunity for thought, control, and imagination. These cognitively gripped objects
are not simply thought aids like calculators; things that speed up what, in principle,
we can do otherwise. They let us do things we cannot do without them, or at least
not without huge effort. The implications of a theory of thinking that allows lifeless
material things to be actual constituents of the thinking process are far reaching. They
point to a future where one day, because of digital enhancement and good design, it
will be mundane to think what is today unconceivable. Without cognitively informed
designers we will never get there.
1.1. Overview and Organization
This article has six sections. In the next section, Section 2, I review some of the lit-
erature on tool absorption [Maravita and Iriki 2004], and tie this to a discussion of
the theory of enactive perception [O’Regan and Noe¨ 2001; Noe¨ 2005], to explain why
tool absorption changes the way we perceive the world. The short answer is that in
addition to altering our sense of where our body ends each tool reshapes our “enactive
landscape”—-the world we see and partly create as active agents. With a tool in our
hands we selectively see what is tool relevant; we see tool-dependent affordances; we
extend our exploratory and probative capacities. This is obvious for a blind man with a
cane, who alters his body’s length and gains tactile knowledge of an otherwise invisible
world three feet away. His new detailed knowledge of the nearby changes his sense of
the terrain, and of the shape of things too big to handle but small enough to sweep. He
revises his perceptual apprehension of the peripersonal1 both because he can sweep
faster than he can touch and because he has extended his peripersonal field [Iriki et al.
1996; Ladavas 1998]. It is less obvious, though no less true, that a cook who is clever
with a blade, or knows how to wield a spatula, sees the cooking world differently than
a neophyte. Skill with a knife informs how to look at a chicken prior to its dismem-
berment; it informs how one looks at an unpeeled orange or a cauliflower, attending to
this or that feature, seeing possibilities that are invisible to more naı¨ve chefs or diners.
The same holds for spatulas. Without acquaintance with a spatula one would be blind
to the affordances of food that make them cleanly liftable off of surfaces, or the role
and meaning of the way oil coats a surface. With expertise comes expert perception
[Goodwin 1994; Aglioti et al. 2008]. This is a core commitment of embodiment theory:
the concepts and beliefs we have about the world are grounded in our perceptual-action
experience with things, and the more we have tool-mediated experiences the more our
understanding of the world is situated in the way we interact through tools.
In Section 3, the longest part of the article, I present some remarkable findings that
arose in our study of superexpert dancers.
One might think that we already know what our bodies are good for. To some extent,
we do. For instance, the by now classic position of embodied cognition is that the more
actions you can perform themore affordances you register (e.g., if you can juggle you can
see an object as affording juggling) [Gibson 1966]. Our bodies also infiltrate cognition
because our early sensory experience of things, our particular history of interactions
with them, figures in how we understand them ever after. Meaning is modal-sensory
specific [Barsalou 2008]. If we acquired knowledge of a thing visually, or we tend to
1Peripersonal space is the three-dimensional volume within arm’s reach and leg’s reach. Visual stimuli near
a hand are coded by neurons with respect to the hand, not the eyes or some other location reflecting egocentric
location [Makin et al. 2007].
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identify that thing on visual grounds, we stimulate these historic neural connections
in the later visual cortex when thinking of it [Barsalou 1999]. These visual experiences
often activate motor representations too, owing to our history of motor involvement
with the things we see. Thus, when thinking or speaking we regain access to the
constellation of associations typical of interacting with the thing. Even just listening
to language can trigger these activations in the associative cortex. The sentence “the
alarm sounded and John jumped out of bed” will activate areas in the auditory and
motor cortex related to alarms and jumping out of bed [Kaschak et al. 2006; Winter
and Bergen 2012]. This is the received embodiment view.
In the findings reported here I discuss additional ways bodies can play a role in
cognitive processing, ways we can use the physical machinery of the body and not just
our sensory cortex and its associative network. This means that our bodies are good for
more things than have traditionally been assumed. More specifically, I discuss howe
we use our bodies as simulation devices to physically model things.
For example, we found in our study with dancers that they are able to learn and con-
solidate mastery of a reasonably complex dance phrase better by physically practicing
a distorted model of the phrase than by mentally simulating the phrase undistorted. If
all that matters is what happens in the brain we would not observe this difference in
learning between simulating in the head and simulating with the body. But somehow,
by modeling a movement idea bodily, even when the model is imperfect, the dancers
we studied were able to learn more about the structure of their dance movement than
by simulating it without moving. Perhaps this intuitive. But more surprisingly, the
dancers learned the phrase better by working with the distorted model than by prac-
ticing the way one intuitively thinks they should: by physically executing the phrase,
or parts of it, in a complete and undistorted manner, repeatedly. In other words, our
dancers learned best when they explored a dance phrase by making a physical model
of the phrase (through dancing it), even though the model they made was imperfect.
Standard practice might not be considered to be modeling. No one predicted that find-
ing! The dancers seem to be using their bodies in a special way when they make these
imperfect models.
This is not specific to dance. Mechanics trying to understand a machine may sketch
on paper an imprecise or distorted model. This can help them explore mechanical
subsystems or help them consider physical principles. Architects may sketch in fluid
strokes their early ideas to get a feel for the way light pours in, or how people might
move through a space. Accuracy is not important, flow is. Violinists when practicing
a hard passage may work on their bowing while largely neglecting their fingers. They
are not aiming for perfection in the whole performance; they are fixating on aspects.
To fixate on certain aspects it may be easier to work with their body and instrument
than to think about those aspects “offline” in their head. These sorts of methods may
be common and intuitive; but on reflection, it is odd, to say the least, that practicing
(literally) the wrong thing can lead to better performance of the right thing [Kirsh et al.
2012]. I think this technique is prevalent, and deeply revealing.
Does anyone understand how or why it works? The knee-jerk reply is that for
sketches, at least, the function of the activity is to take something that is transi-
tory and internal—a thought or idea—and convert it into something that is persistent
and external—a sketch. This allows the agent to come back to it repeatedly, and to
interact with it in different ways than something purely in mind [Buxton 2007]. But
persistence doesn’t explain the utility of making physical actions like gesturing, violin
bowing, or dancing, all of which are external but ephemeral. How do we think with
these ephemera?
Section 4 explores why such ephemera might be so effective. The answer I offer
is that body activity may figure as an external mediating structure in thinking and
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practicing. The dance practice we observed, called “marking” in the dance world, seems
to work well because the dancers model just the aspects of a movement they want to
think about. This is better than mental simulation alone because making the body
move through step one may prime step two more forcefully than just running through
step one in the mind’s eye. Motor cortex primes motor cortex. Predictably, we also found
that practicing the correct movement is a better way to practice than lying down and
running through a movement idea mentally. But if getting the body to move for the
sake of motor and procedural priming were all that is special about physical practice
then why would practicing distorted movements yield better learning than practicing
the correct movement?
To explain why working with an imperfect model might be better than working
with the real thing, I explore how the body, or physical models more generally, can
help people project the structure or idea they are most interested in. When a dancer
marks a movement with her body she creates a cognitive support for herself that helps
her to: (a) manage what she will attend to at each moment, (b) focus her thought on
the relevant features or aspects of the movement idea, and (c) compute outcomes and
trajectories, ultimately in ways that may be better than through mental simulation, or
better even than through correct physical practice (and hence kinesthetic perception
too). Sometimes working with a simpler thing, even if it is imperfect, is better than
working with a perfect thing.
The comparative advantage of using imperfect models is variable. Sometimes it is
best to work directly with real things; to dance the real phrase if you can, to practice the
whole musical passage, or to work with real engines. This is probably true for simple
dance phrases, simple musical passages, and simple physical objects. Whether it is
more effective to workwith the real thing or amodel depends, of course, on what you are
trying to accomplish. Sometimes it is easier to manipulate models than to manipulate
the real thing. The real thing may be cumbersome, heavy, or slow and difficult to
handle. Sometimes it is better to gesture, sketch, or work with a simplified model.
For certain tasks, working with a model has a better cost structure, both physically
and cognitively. Similarly, dancing a real phrase may require coping with too many
complexities at once. An imperfect model may be more flexible, simple, and adaptable
than the real thing.
The same benefits, however, may hold for mental images, which is why sometimes it
is so useful to work things through in one’s head rather than working directly with real
things. Mental images, just as gestures and simplifiedmovements, are fast and flexible.
So predictably, sometimes they are themost convenient thing to think with, better than
embodiedmodels (that is, gestures and overt movements) and better than working with
the real thing. But working with a mental image also has limitations. When an object
has a complicated spatial structure, or is highly detailed, it is often easier to simulate
outcomes by manipulating either the real physical thing, or an appropriately simplified
physical model of the thing than to simulate manipulating that thing through mental
imagery [Kirsh and Maglio 1995; Wexler et al. 1998]. It all depends on the internal
and external cost structure of the manipulation, what is often called the mental and
physical costs. The scientific challenge is to determine the right dimensions to measure
cost [Kirsh 2010]. If we can discover these dimensions, we may be able to predict when
working with a basic model is best; that some-times simplified physical models, even
biased ones, are better things to think with and practice with than either working with
“real” things or working with internal imagery.
The upshot is that, given our case study, it seems that imperfect models can, at times,
help us outperform ourselves. Despite our not yet knowing exactly when imperfect
models help us outclass, my own belief is that we use our bodies (and hands) far more
often for modeling than previously appreciated. This has implications for design. If it is
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true that imperfect modeling can, at times, facilitate thinking and learning better than
imagination or better than working with the real object of knowledge, the question
arises as to why we must be the modeling agent. Why not watch someone else be the
external simulator or watch a computer-created simulation? Maybe it is possible to
make our thinking process run faster, or cheaper, or deeper if we piggyback on the
actions of others or on the actions of computers.
In Section 5, I present additional results from video analysis of choreographic cre-
ation to show that using one’s own body to explore a dance movement is a better way to
understand a dance movement than watching someone else explore it. This may seem
obvious, but the point needs to be made because there has been so much discussion in
the neuroscience literature on the power of the motor resonance system [Rizzolati and
Sinigaglia 2007; Agnew et al. 2007; Aglioti et al. 2008].
There is extensive neurophysiological evidence of a close link between action ob-
servation and action execution. For reviews, see Viviani [2002], Buccino et al. [2004],
Rizzolatti and Craighero [2004], Wilson and Knoblich [2005]. It has been convincingly
argued that we reenact or mimic an actor’s movements by covertly behaving as if we
are the actor rather than the observer [Sebanz and Shiffrar 2007]. These covert actions
can be subliminal. The motor system can be activated by “imagining actions, recogniz-
ing tools, learning by observation, or even understanding the behavior of other people”
[Jeannerod 1994, 2001], as well by the processes of motor preparation that underpin
“[intended] actions that will eventually be executed” [Jeannerod 2001]. So a covert ac-
tion is the internal counterpart that may or may not be hooked up to an overt action. As
Jeannerod, the originator of the idea, said “Every overtly executed action implies the
existence of a covert stage, whereas a covert action does not necessarily turn out into
an overt action” [Jeannerod 2001]. The surprising thing is that processes in this covert
system may be so strong that that even just watching an action may be as powerful
a learning experience as performing an action oneself [Cross et al. 2009]. This means
that we might be able to watch someone else gesture or dance or manipulate gears or
sketch a structure and our thinking is driven forward just as effectively as if we were
the one overtly gesturing, or dancing, etc. Although the comparison is rarely made, an
analogy to listening to someone speak may be apt. When attending to someone talk, if
listener and speaker are in tune with them, they seem to synchronize their thinking.
To make sense of their speech, their inferences must largely march in step. Might this
cognitive resonance also apply by watching others perform action or by watching them
manipulate objects?
This ties in with a further thesis of embodied cognition: to fullymake sense of what we
are seeingwe need to run ourmotor system simultaneously withwatching to get a sense
of what it would be like if we were to perform the action ourselves. Our sympathetic
body involvement grounds the meaning of action in a personal way. It activates an
ideomotor representation that gives us first-person knowledge of another’s action [Shin
et al. 2010]. Because we see things as if we are the agent we understand the point of
the action, the details to be attended to, and the reason it unfolds as it does [Knoblich
and Flach 2001]. When we experience another’s action as if we were that person, we
can appreciate why it makes sense to do things that way. We covertly compute the
subgoal structure of the action. [Prinz 1997]. Evaluating the scope and limits of this
central claim is important in building a balanced view of embodied cognition.
I address this question briefly, again using data from our dance study, by discussing
the extra knowledge the choreographer of the piece acquired by executing movement
rather than just watching it. I speculate that the key extra he received from overt bodily
involvement over and beyond what he would get by simulating an action covertly is
knowledge of kinesthetic things that have no visual counterpart: for instance, pain,
resistance, gravitational pull.
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What is true for choreographic creativity likely applies to other types of creativity.
I believe the cognitive importance of overt action generalizes beyond dance and is
important for designers to understand. For as we look for new and better ways to
extend cognition, we need to know when and how effectively we can piggyback off the
efforts of others—how and when we learn by watching—rather than having to be the
acting agent who learns by overt doing.
In Section 6, I briefly unify the theory of tools and bodily thinking into an account
of how objects, and not just body parts, can be brought into the thinking process. This
too is important for designers, since it offers a possible foundation for the power of
tangible and physical interfaces. I conclude the article with a brief coda reviewing the
main ideas and some of their further implications for interaction design.
2. TOOLS CHANGE OUR BODY, OUR PERCEPTION, OUR CONCEPTION
2.1. The Space Around Us
Studies based on human lesion, monkey neurophysiology, and human imaging, such
as fMRI and TMS (Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation), provide evidence that when
suitably embodied, human and mammal brains construct multiple representations of
space [Colby 1998; Graziano and Gross 1995]. Certain brain cells fire specifically when
objects approach the space around the body, such as when we see an insect fly toward
our face, or when our hands are about to be touched. This near-body region is called
peripersonal space. It can be understood informally as the space surrounding an agent
that is within easy reach [Ladavas et al. 1998; Brain 1941]. In addition to peripersonal
representations there are neural representations for personal and extrapersonal space.
Personal space refers to the space occupied by the body itself [Vaishnavi et al. 1999;
Coslett 1998; Bisiach et al. 1986]. Extrapersonal space refers to space beyond the reach
of our limbs [Previc 1998; Brain 1941].
2.2. Tools Change Our Body Schema
Tools bear a special relation to peripersonal space since we code the distances of nearby
things in manipulation-relative and touch-relative ways [Maravita et al. 2002]. That
is, we code what is nearby—more precisely, what is “within reach”—in terms of how far
we have to move our arms and hands to manipulate or touch things. When we use a
tool to reach for a distant object it is as if we are extending our motor capability and we
treat our hand as if it is elongated to the tip of the tool. Tool use transiently modifies
action space representation by revising what is now within reach. No surprise, then,
that humans can quickly adapt their spatial representation to functionally meaningful
things such as within fly-swatter distance, tennis reach distance, fencing distance and
even pole-vaultable height. As Maravita and Iriki [2004] put it, “neurophysiological,
psychological and neuropsychological research suggests that this extended motor ca-
pability is followed by changes in specific neural networks that hold an updated map of
body shape and posture (the putative ‘Body Schema’).” Apparently, we change our body
schema to include a tool’s dimensions (or at least its end-point). We absorb the tool
into our functioning body2. The original work by Iriki et al. [1996] showed that when
Japanese macaques were given a rake and three weeks of training in using the rake to
pull in food pellets just beyond their reach, the specific neurons representing the hand
and arm, as well as the space around these body parts, changed their firing pattern to
include the rake and the space around it. In interview Iriki described it this way:
2A further question worth asking is whether our somatic representation of the rigidity and strength of our
“extended” limbs is altered when we hold a rigid tool or strap on large skis.
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“In the parietal association area, there are neurons that compare somatic
sensation with visual information and become activated upon recognizing
the body. In untrained monkeys, these neurons do not become activated
because the rake is nothing more than a foreign implement. After they
become able to use the rake as a tool as a result of training, however, the
neurons become active as if the rake is recognized as an extension of the
hand.” Iriki [2009].
2.3. Extending the Body and Redefining the Peripersonal
The tools we have discussed reshape our peripersonal space by extending it a few feet.
Can tools let us extend it to terrains that are geographically remote? This is a useful
question for interaction designers. For designers work with a sense of where the body
ends and the environment begins. If certain tools can be absorbed, this body boundary
becomes an element to be negotiated in design.
There is ample anecdotal reportage that our sense of where our body boundaries
are, and what in space we can affect can be altered through tele-presence and tele-
immersion. With digital help we can act on objects arbitrarily distant and then per-
ceptually sense what we are doing. For example, there are tele-presence systems that
enable an operator to manage a submersible on the ocean floor, a land vehicle in a war
zone, and a scalpel in another town’s operating theater, while all the while ensconced
in a cozy room some miles away. Given the right sensori-motor hookup the remote
human feels as if she is in contact with a robust “enactive landscape” to think, speak,
and interact with, as if there. One might think, before studying, that the key success
condition is for the tele-agent to have worked in the relevant enactive landscape up
close first, using his or her unaided hands and eyes. You need to have worked with a
scalpel in your actual hand before mastering it in your digital hand. But this is not
really necessary. Pilots of submersibles can be trained on remote enactive landscapes
from the start as long as action and feedback are close enough in time. It seems that
what falls into your peripersonal space, at one or another moment, can be negotiated
early on through practice with tools.
This raises the next question. How different can our remote “body parts” be from our
own before we cannot assimilate them? Snap-on arms and legs are one thing. But how
about two sets of nine-fingered claws that operate in articulate and continuous ways?
Controlling these by means of a piano-like multifingered input device might work for
claws with ten or less fingers. But what about twelve-fingered claws, and what about
having the fingers work in continuous fashion? Probably not impossible; but clearly an
interface challenge. And then there is the question of how different a scene in a virtual
world can be before it shatters our situated grasp of things? Can we cope with a world
that runs at clock speeds fifty times our own?
A rudimentary start on experimentally determining the constraints on embodied
extensions was made by Ikiri et al. [1998] when testing to see if a monkey’s sense of
hand size changes by replacing the normal image of its hand with an enlarged one. As
reported by Blakelee [2004]:
“Dr. Iriki allowed the monkeys to see a virtual hand on a video monitor
while the monkey’s real hand, hidden from view, operated a joystick. When
he made the image of the hand larger, the monkey’s brain treated the virtual
hand as if it were an enlarged version of its own; the brain’s hand area blew
up like a cartoon character’s hand.” Evidently, anatomical mappings can be
remapped.
How far can these remapping transformations go? An enlarged hand seems innocent
when compared with some of the mutant alterations we can imagine. Is a person like
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Edward Scissorhands possible? Are there limits onwhat can be a prosthetic “body part”?
And can these bizarre body parts, especially the ones that involve distant interaction,
be incorporated into our peripersonal space as long as we tightly control them? These
are open questions for the embodiment program. They address the core HCI question:
what makes a tool, prosthetic, or digital helper work and feel natural? What are the
limits to neuroadaptation driven by immersion?
2.4. Tools also Change Our Perception
Perception is altered by our skill in using tools. This is the next implication of extending
the embodiment paradigm to include tools. Hills look steeper than normal to subjects
wearing a heavy backpack [Proffitt 2006].When a tool is absorbed into our body schema,
our perception of height, distance, and related magnitudes changes. The added effort
of carrying around weight affects perception. That is just a start. The space in front
of a car is affected by the maneuverability, power, and speed of the car. Gibson called
this “a sort of tongue protruding forward along the road” [Gibson and Crooks 1938].
It is something like the safe operating envelope, the stable handling region, “the field
of possible paths which the car may take unimpeded” [Gibson and Crooks 1938]. By
parity of reasoning we would predict that warehouse staff wearing roller-skates will
judge the length of inventory shelves to be shorter, as they speed down aisles looking
at the way things can be picked up. Downhill skiers will view the traversability of the
terrain differently when wearing skis than when wearing boots, and surfers will view
waves differently depending on whether they are on a short or a long board. In all these
cases, equipment affects how things are seen because how we act on the world, and the
tasks we perform, shape how we perceive.
In the Gibsonion approach to perception [Gibson 1966] the world to be perceived
is defined relative to the action repertoire of a perceiver A{a1,a2, . . . an}. Change the
repertoire and you change the mode of interaction by which the perceptual world is
partly constituted. With a tool, the action repertoire is increased to include tool-enabled
actions, so there ought to be new affordances to perceive. Remarkably, Gibson wrote
next to nothing on the effect of tools on perception or the relation between tool and
affordance.3 This points to a tension in the classical Gibsonian position. Holding a
hammer or carrying a lit cigarette is not a function of untutored human bodies. These
behaviors are not in our native action repertoire, our culture free repertoire. But they
are natural in an artifactual world, the real world we inhabit. They have consequences
Gibson would have appreciated. For instance, as most of us have unfortunately ob-
served, a person who smokes cigarettes will see most physical environments as filled
with things and areas that afford catching ash, things that can serve as ashtrays.
Nonsmokers are blind to them. A stonemason will look at bricks for places to apply
cement; when looking at an odd brick he will “see” the particular trowel shape that is
needed. A competent tool user may perceive the affordances brought into existence by
her use of tools, even when those tools are not in her hands!
Skill is a factor too. A person’s skill in using a tool partly determines the conditions
in which it can be used successfully. An expert carpenter can use a chisel effectively
in more situations than a novice. Accordingly, skill affects what an agent will see in
a given situation; skilled tool users detect more tool-relevant features, tool-related
affordances, than lesser-skilled users.
3See Jones [2003] where the word “tool” does not appear in his discussion of Gibson’s evolving conception of
affordance over his lifetime.
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2.5. Goals Make Perception Enactive
Goals also figure in perception. This view moves us beyond Gibsonian exegesis to a
more enactive paradigm [Varela et al. 1991]. The enactive account of perception [Myin
and O’Regan 2008; Noe¨ 2005] starts from the Gibsonian insight that perception is
active and based on the possibilities of interaction, but it then adds three more things:
interests, attention, and phenomenology. These lead to a conception of an environment
that is both more and less than Gibson assumed.
When something grabs our attention we often fail to notice things that are visually
obvious. This is called attention blindness [Simons 2000]. In a famous example, subjects
failed to notice a person in a gorilla suit a few feet in front of them because they were
concentrating on whether a basketball was being passed legally. They were so focused
on the ball they ignored the hairy legs and hands, and the mask.
We also overlook elements in full view when we are distracted by a major change,
especially if the “in your face” change occurs simultaneously with the other changes.
This is called change blindness [Rensink 2002]. Jointly, the effect of this dual blindness
is that the world we experience is a tiny fraction of what is there to be perceived. Like
a hyperbolic visualization, we exaggerate the parts we are interested in and remain
unaware of parts that hold no interest. Because the tools we carry are usually related
to our goals and activities, indirectly they shape attention and interest. They narrow
and expand our view hyperbolically.
At the same time, though, when we see something, we don’t just see what our eyes
have taken in; we factor in predictions about what we expect to take in if we continue to
look around. Phenomenologically, we experience more of the world than there often is.
For instance, when people look at Andy Warhol’s Wall of Marilyns they do not saccade
to every print of Marilyn [Noe¨ 2005]. They look at a few, perhaps examine some quite
closely, and peripherally register the rest. Yet their experience is of a complete wall
of Marilyns. Somehow their current perceptual experience includes the counterfactual
beliefs of what they would see were they to look at each and every print closely.4
2.6. Enactive Landscape
Let us introduce the idea of an enactive landscape as the structure that an agent
cocreates with the world when he or she acts in a goal-oriented manner. An enactive
landscape is meant to capture the goal- or activity-dependent nature of the perceptual
world. It is themerger of a few ideas: task environment – the states and actions that are
related to the achieving the goals and interests of the agent, the broader set of outside
things or properties that can be acted on by that agent, and the full range of properties
that agent can discriminate. The idea of an enactive landscape is a useful concept for
designers to bear in mind when inventing new tools or systems because when a person
has a tool in his hands his reshape their enactive landscape: they perceive more things
4This approach is worth putting in computational terms. To capture the idea that our counterfactual expec-
tations are already factored into our experience we can represent perceptual experience as the current state
of a predictive system, a broad-branched Markhov system of some sort, or a predictive state representation.
Each branch, each path, represents an action that might be taken: a saccade to the far image, a step to the
right and glance forward, and so on. Attached to each action is a probability of what one would likely see or
feel. The predictive system should be further constrained by adding biases on the probability of actions that
are a function of the goals and interests of the agent. Thus, an art historian, because of his interests, might
be more likely to approach etchings closely to examine the printing technique than a casual observer. Or,
returning to a cigarette smoker, because her cigarette-related interests are strongly activated when in the
act of smoking, she is even more likely to look around for ashtray-like things. This constructed counterfac-
tual space, with a probability distribution over outcomes that factors in the likelihood of a particular person
acting in a certain way, is what defines the current state of a perceiver and what determines her experience.
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and properties when working with a tool than they would when working unaided. In a
sense, designers create enactive landscapes by designing tools.
Take the case of musical instruments. Apart from voice or clapping, music comes into
being because musicians use musical instruments. No music makers and no musical
instruments then no music.5 Musical instruments provide the basic physical landscape
a musician encounters. But the more skillful the musician, the larger the enactive
landscape they inhabit, because skills combine with instruments to constitute a bigger
world of possibilities. Music, conceptualized as this bigger world of instrument created
possibilities, is an extreme instance of an enactive landscape. To a musician it is the set
of possibilities that because of their instrument they can bring into being. An enactive
landscape, then, is the set of possibilities that can in principle be brought into being
when an agent interacts with an underlying environment while engaged in a task or
pursuing a goal.
To complete this picture we need to remember that much of our environment is
defined by rules and cultural constraints. Chess, sports and other games depend more
on their rules, then on physical things like boards, playing areas, pieces and equipment.
Rules and cultural influencesmean that the same physical kitchen can constitutemany
cooking landscapes. The enactive landscape of a cook emerges from the interplay of a
cook’s interests and the cultural resources – such as recipes, food and taste preferences
– with the physical things present – the ingredients, pots and pans, heat and layout
of the kitchen. Each chef ’s vision is primed to notice the details of their physical space
as it relates to their current recipe and their cooking style. [Almeida et al., 2008]. In
fact, looked at more closely, at each moment what a chef sees is partly primed by the
tools in their hand. They see the things they might cut when they have a knife in their
hands, the places to lay a dirty spatula when they are holding a spatula and so on.
The same tunnel vision will apply during medical surgery. We are always primed to see
the elements we expect to see as we precede in a task or an activity. [Endsley 1995].
This means that the probability distribution that weights the possibilities present in
an enactive landscape, will dynamically change as the agent shifts around the goal and
sub-goal structure of his or her task.
Given, further, that we all multitask during most of our waking life, the actual en-
vironment we live in, must be a superposition of dozens of enactive landscapes, each
one with its own set of prediction generating elements and attention drawing features,
rising and falling with our shifting interests. [Kirsh 2005]. In designing a workplace,
then, skill resides in blending the many enactive landscapes of its probable inhabitants
to minimize error, maximize effectiveness, reduce fatigue and delight aesthetic sensi-
bilities. Understanding the role of tools in shaping these enactive landscapes is a first
step. The second step is to understand how co-creation evolves. Embodied cognition
offers us new conceptual tools to analyze agent environment interaction.
2.7. Tools Change Our Conceptions
The final way tools change how we engage the world is by reshaping our conception of
what is present and what is possible, not just our perception. An agent’s immersion in
an enactive landscape inevitably leads to concept formation. We are learning engines.
Most of the concepts we learn are highly situated and ad hoc [Barsalou 1983]. They
arise as meaningful elements in the activity that cocreates an enactive landscape, but
may not have obvious natural generalizations. For instance, the way we perceive a beer
bottle as we struggle to open it will typically give rise to the concept of trying-to-twist-
a-cap-off. The phenomenon (the trying process) and the concept (the idea of what we
5We ignore the Platonist claim that music is part of an ideal realm on par with numbers and other mathe-
matical objects independent of construction.
ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction, Vol. 20, No. 1, Article 3, Publication date: March 2013.
3:12 D. Kirsh
are trying to do), are embedded in the cap opening activity. The idea of cap-twisting
may eventually be generalized beyond beer bottles to other domains and tasks, losing
its ad hoc status. But it started out highly situated in the specifics of beer bottles.
When we use tools we multiply our ad hoc concepts because they multiply our enactive
landscapes.
Opening beer bottles is typical of everyday tasks. Every task has its ad hoc concepts:
washing our hands (ad hoc concept: the idiosyncratic way we each use hand soap),
putting on socks (ad hoc concept: how we arrange each sock before slipping our foot in),
sitting down (ad hoc concept: the way we stick our bottom out as we bend our knees). In
each task there are task-specific things that represent points of learning or indicators
of mastery. The hallmark of an ad hoc concept is that there is an attendable something,
a potentially meaningful attribute that can be identified, attended to, referred to at the
time (at least in thought), that is revealed in the performance of the task. Not everyone
will have the same ad hoc concepts, but in any task there are always many things we
must attend to and which can become objects of thought. Some are the affordances in
the environment, others are the actions we perform, or the special way we perform
them.
What does this unending, and potentially idiosyncratic, production of ad hoc concepts
mean to designers? It tells us that design is never finished and never truly universal.
When agents have an ad hoc concept they are in a position to think explicitly about their
situation reflectively. For instance, TV watchers often surf between channels. Channel
surfing is an emergent behavior that, once recognized, can drive the desire for change.
Without the concept it is unlikely that anyone would identify the standard hassles with
channel surfing. For instance, who has not had the irritation of switching from one
channel because of a commercial, only to return to it after the program has restarted?
This hassle, that is, the difficulty of timingwhen a commercial has finished – constitutes
a design opportunity. In some TV’s this need is met by a picture-in-picture feature that
permits watchers to monitor the last channel while surfing, then toggling immediately
back. The concept of channel surfing is typical of the cycle of how design gives rise
to new and emergent behaviors that in turn give rise to new designs. It highlights
how learning in our built-up world is continuous and how enactive landscapes are
both personal and evolving. This year’s cost structure incorrectly measures next year’s
interactions as learning changes our behavior and cost benefit function [Kirsh 2010].
3. RETHINKING THE ROLE OUR BODY PLAYS IN COGNITION
So far we have discussed how our tools and bodies are used to achieve pragmatic goals.
Bodies and tools can be used for nonpragmatic goals as well. Professional dancers, when
practicing, use their bodies nonpragmatically for epistemic and “cognitive” purposes—
specifically as a means to physically model things. The same may sometimes be true
for gestures [Goldin-Meadow 2005; Goldin-Meadow Beilock 2010] and for many of the
things we manipulate. We think with them. Manipulating a physical thing is, at times,
a method for driving thought forward. In this part we provide empirical support for
this claim and speculate on why it is true.
3.1. An Experiment with Superexpert Dancers
The data to be reported comes from a single experiment undertaken in 2010 to test the
effectiveness of different ways of practicing a new dance phrase. It is part of a much
more comprehensive cognitive ethnographic study exploring embodied and distributed
cognition in dance creation. See Kirsh et al. [2009], Kirsh [2012a, 2012b], and Kirsh
et al. [2012] for a description of that larger project. In this experiment we found that
partially modeling a dance phrase by marking the phrase, as it is called in the dance
world, is a better method of practicing than working on the complete phrase, that is,
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Fig. 1. (a) An Irish river dancer is caught in mid move; (b) the same move is marked using just the hands.
River dancing is a type of step dancing where the arms are kept still. Typically, river dancers mark steps
and positions using one hand for the movement and the other for the floor. Most marking involves modeling
phrases with the whole body, and not just the hands.
practicing full-out. We also found that both marking and full-out practice are better
methods of practicing than repeated mental simulation, a process found effective in
other activities. (see Kossylyn and Moulton 2009]. This last result is intuitive: it is
better to practice physically than solely in one’s head. But the first result, that partial
modeling—a form of practicing a dance phrase aspect-by-aspect—can at times be better
than trying to duplicate the perfect dance phraseS is a surprising result. Its explanation
brings us closer to appreciating how physical activity—with body or tools—can help
drive thought. Our results also suggest that prior work on learning by observation and
learning by mental practice may not scale up to complex movements. Externalizing
thought processes improves or reshapes inner processes.
3.2. What Is Marking?
As discussed briefly in the Introduction, marking refers to dancing a phrase in a less
than complete manner. See Figure 1 for an example of hand marking, a form that is far
smaller than the more typical method of marking that involves modeling a phrase with
thewhole body.Marking is part of the practice of dance, pervasive in all phases: whether
creation, practice, rehearsal, or reflection. Virtually all English-speaking dancers know
the term, though few, if any, scholarly articles exist that describe the process or give
instructions on how to do it.6
When dancers mark a phrase, they use their body’s movement and structural form
as a support structure for imagining the real thing, or perhaps as a representational
vehicle pointing to the real thing or some aspect of it. The key feature is that they
do not recreate the full dance phrase they normally perform; instead, they create a
simplified or abstracted version—a model, a 3D sketch.
The received wisdom is that dancers mark to save energy, to avoid strenuous move-
ment such as jumps, and to practice without exhausting themselves emotionally. But
when they mark they often report that they are working in a special way, such as
reviewing or exploring specific aspects of a phrase, its tempo, movement sequence, or
underlying intention, and that by marking they can do this review without the mental
complexity involved in creating the phrase “full-out.”7
6Search by professional librarians of dance in the U.K. and U.S. has yet to turn up scholarly articles on the
practice of marking.
7These reports were gathered by the author during interviews with dancers in the Random Dance company,
as part of this study on marking.
ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction, Vol. 20, No. 1, Article 3, Publication date: March 2013.
3:14 D. Kirsh
Marking, or the practice of creating a simplified version of a process—a personal
model to work and think with—is found in countless activities beyond dance. Adults
who play tennis, golf, or basketball can be seen running through a “practice” swing or
shot for themselves, as if to prepare themselves for the real thing. Sometimes they even
do this without a racket, club or ball. Cellists will sometimes practice passages on their
arm, running through finger positions on their “right forearm held upright in front of
the chest, as a substitute for the neck of the cello” [Potter 1980, page 109] in a manner
reminiscent of an Irish river dancer hand marking a jig. No sound emerges. Theatrical
performers, too, can often be seen muttering their lines, or executing “practice” moves
before stepping out on stage. It is a standard activity in theater to do an “Italian run-
through”—a slang phrase for saying one’s lines and moving about the stage extra fast
when staging a play to clarify the timing and relative positions of the actors. All these
cases are related to marking. The common element throughout is that people seem to
prefer workingwith a simplified version of a procedure to practicing the full-out version.
In a slightly different way, playing tennis or ping-pong on the Wii is substantially like
marking the real thing.
3.3. Why this Matters to Designers
Much learning and training is based on full-out practice. Why is this the most effi-
cient way to teach everything? If our results generalize, then procedures and skills,
in particular, might be better taught by a process akin to marking, where we create
little models of things, or use our own bodies to pantomime what we must do. This is a
highly general idea that can become a focus of good design for the learning component
of any device. Moreover, as an example of an understudied way that humans think, it
opens up new approaches to designing things as different as tools for problem solving,
recipes for cooking, or resources for smarter collaboration. We return to this shortly.
3.4. Why this Matters more Generally
The finding that marking is the best method of practicing challenges common sense
and previous work on complex motor learning. It is common sense that practicing
something the way it should be performed ought to be more effective than practicing
it with intentional distortions, or with essential components missing. If that were not
so then repeatedly drawing a face in caricature, or perhaps in some other distorted
fashion, rather than drawing it realistically ought to lead eventually to drawing the
face more realistically than doing one’s best to draw it correctly each trial. Similarly,
practicing tennis stokes without a ball, or by ignoring one’s body position during impact,
ought to lead to better shots at times than always practicing in proper form. Future
experiments may show that both these marking-like methods are, in fact, better forms
of practice than always practicing in an undistorted, full way. There are well-known
precedents. In music performance, for example, using exaggeration in rehearsal is
thought to be a helpful method of practicing, delivering results that surpass repeated
full-out play [Hinz 2008]. Players often practice one aspect of a passage—its fingering,
rhythm, or bowing, while neglecting intonation or tonality [Stern and Patok 2001].
Evidently, marking may already have a valued place in training.8 But as a general
method, practicing only distorted versions of the real thing, or versions that leave out
8Marking does not have an acknowledged value as a form of practice in dance despite its universality.
Choreographers and dancers recognize that they cannot always practice the full form or a movement. But
marking is thought to be a distant second best method. [oral communication by Wayne McGregor, and other
professional dancers].
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essential components, is a counterintuitive method of rehearsal. Our unanticipated
result is that this counterintuitive method can be effective.
Our findings also challenge recent work on dance learning. In several experiments
[Cross et al. 2009], found that repeated exposure to a target phrase—and hence
“practice” by mental simulation in the motor resonance system—leads to compara-
ble performance to full-out physical practice. This unexpected result was found to hold
for learning the rhythm and steps for pieces in a game like Dance Dance Revolution
(DDR), where subjects must stamp their right or left foot onto footprints on a mat in
time with music. Subjects watched the video repeatedly and may have played covertly.
In our experiment, the phrases to be mastered were far more complex than DDR, in-
volving movement of the entire body, with dynamics and feeling. When confronted
with these more complex phrases we found that dancers benefited far more from
marking and full-out practice than simulation. This suggests that moving the body
in a controlled manner, even if not close in form to the target movement, can facilitate
performance.
If our results about marking are true then marking during dance practice should not
be seen as a sign of fatigue or laziness, as it so often is in dance studios. Rather, it may
be a strategic method for selective training. This opens the door to developing more
effective methods of selectively working on “aspects” of a phrase. We speculate that
the success of marking also tells us something about how the body itself can be used
to help manage attention, improve focus, and even facilitate simulation in a selective
way. The body may well draw attention to what is important in an activity in the way
a hand in speed-reading drags the eyes to help reading.
3.5. Conjecture and Method
When designing the experiment, our conjecture was the following.
(1) Practicing a dance phrase full-out would be better than mental simulation,
(2) Marking would lie somewhere in the middle: better than mental simulation but
worse than full-out.
Owing to the power of the motor resonance system we wanted to see if anything would
be gained by adding body activity to the mental simulation and projection we thought
occurred during marking anyway. Our belief was that dancers would learn something
from marking, just not as much as from practicing full-out. To test this idea we used
the dancers from Random Dance, the contemporary company we have been studying
[Kirsh et al. 2009]. All these dancers are superexperts, chosen from an audition pool of
800 professional dancers throughout Europe and the States.
3.6. Procedure
The design required dividing the ten dancers in Random Dance into three groups: A, B,
C. All three groups were brought into the studio and taught a new dance phrase lasting
about 55 seconds. The teaching phase lasted 10 minutes. At the end of it, the group left
the studio and the dancers returned, one by one, to the studio and performed the dance
in front of the teacher, who graded them to set their baseline. As shown in Figure 2
each group, A, B, C practiced in one of three conditions: full-out, marking, and lying on
their back using mental simulation. They were then individually regarded. After the
first round the dancers swapped practice conditions and were taught a second phrase
of about the same duration and complexity as the first.
Each dancer’s performance was graded according to established criteria—
technicality, memory, timing, and dynamics—first by the teacher in real time and later
by two independent expert observers who reviewed the video frame by frame. Once all
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Fig. 2. Experimental conditions. Subjects practiced mastering a phrase in one of three conditions. They
marked the phrase, practiced it full out, or lay on their back and mentally simulated dancing the phrase.
After being evaluated they had a five-minute rest, changed conditions, and were then taught a new phrase.
In this way all subjects practiced in each condition.
Trail One
40 mins
Trail Two
40 mins
Trail Three
40 mins
10 mins 10 mins 10 mins 10 mins
Teach Phrase 1 Baseline Measure Practice Phrase Final Measure
BREAK  5 mins
10 mins 10 mins 10 mins 10 mins
Teach Phrase 2 Baseline Measure Practice Phrase Final Measure
BREAK  5 mins
10 mins 10 mins 10 mins 10 mins
Teach Phrase 3 Baseline Measure Practice Phrase Final Measure
BREAK  5 mins
D E
Fig. 3. (a) The temporal structure of the experiment is displayed. After a 10-min. teaching phase subjects
are evaluated, then they practice, then they are evaluated again. Learning is understood as the change in
grade acquired during the 10-min. practice phase. (b) the experimental design, a 3 by 3 Latin Square, is
shown.
dancers were graded, the group returned to the same large studio and practiced the
dance for 10 minutes. When practicing they faced in different directions and told not
look at each other. Once this 10-minute practice period was over they left the studio
and, as before, returned one by one to be graded by the same criteria as before. See
Figure 3.
3.7. Measures
Technicality. This means the level of precision found in positions and transitions on
a five-point scale, in increments of .5. How structurally correct is the position? When
a transition is the object of interest, its structural aspect can be assessed along a
technicality dimension too. Other elements of accuracy, such as the phrase’s dynamic
fidelity, are evaluated in the measure on dynamics.
Memory. Memory, or level of detail, refers to the completeness of the movement. Does
the movement display all the elements at each level in the hierarchy of detail?
Timing. This refers to the level of precision in the duration of individual steps and
the duration of transitions. To code timing, coders used frame-by-frame measures for
great precision in comparing test conditions to their normative standard.
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Table II.
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Dynamics. This refer to the force, speed, and acceleration of movements. Various
qualities of motion such as resistance, juiciness, roundness, emotionality, and inten-
tionality are also included in the category of dynamics.
3.8. Results
Our analysis of results showed the following.
(1) Marking is the most effective overall method of practicing, being slightly more
learning efficient than practicing full-out across the key dimensions of Memory,
Technique, and Timing (mean difference = .31; p = .0189). In dynamics, however,
full-out is better.
(2) Both marking and full-out lead to substantially more learning than mental simu-
lation across all dimensions (mean difference = 1.19; p = .0001).
(3) Mental simulation is not a strong form of practice; there was negligible learning
and in many cases practice by mental simulation led to a decrease in performance.
Table II shows themean improvement from practice (the learning delta) as measured
on a 5-point scale. Improvement was best for marking, less for full-out and negative for
mental simulation. The absolute difference in delta between marking and full-out is
0.31, which is significant when measured by the z-score for Technicality, Memory, and
Timing (p = .0189). Full is better for Dynamics but not significantly so (p = .145). All
p values were computed over z-scores to reduce noise caused by variability in dancers,
measure types and graders.
Table III shows that marking is significantly better than full-out for learning the as-
pects of a phrase related to technicality andmemory. Not surprisingly it is less effective
at learning dynamics, which are rarely practiced in marking. Mental simulation was
most effective for thinking about technical elements (precision in movement). It led to
decreased performance, that is, negative learning, for movement details.
To compute these values we first performed one-way ANOVAs on all measures in all
conditions and found highly significant differences throughout. We then ran pairwise
post hoc comparisons (Tukey’s HSD) and computed p values as shown in Table IV.
4. THEORETICAL IDEAS THAT MIGHT EXPLAIN WHY MARKING IS SO EFFECTIVE
What might explain why marking facilitates mental simulation? And what might ex-
plain why marking is better than full-out practice? The explanation I offer highlights a
general process that, I believe, applies more broadly than just to dancing, to practicing
skills and to thinking with the body. The explanatory principle proposed applies also
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Table III.
Learning broken down by dimension
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Table IV. P Values Showing the Significance of Findings.
Measure Mark >Full Full>Mark Mark>Sim Full>Sim
Memory .7334 <.0001 <.0001
Technicality .0029 <.0001 .0005
Timing .0194 <.0001 <.0001
Dynamics - .145 .0003 <.0001
Mem, Tech, Timing .0189 - <.0001 <.0001
to the process by which we think with tools and everyday objects. Marking is merely
an activity where it is especially easy to notice physical thinking.
When dancers mark they project beyond what they are actually doing to a more
ideal movement. We found qualitative support for this idea from interviews with the
dancers. When asked what they think about when marking they reported that they
have in mind the full-out movement, though with fewer dynamics. They do not “see”
themselves dancing in a distorted way, as they would if observing themselves in the
studio mirror while marking, but rather kinesthetically from the inside, feeling the key
aspects of themovement. They seem to be projecting kinesthetically, and to some degree
visually, from their marking movement to the “correct” or normative movement. This
correct movement is what they have in their mind’s eye. Marking is just the external
support or scaffold that helps them have the right mental imagery in mind.
To explain how an imperfect model of a movement—which is what marking literally
is—can behave as a physical support we need to introduce a few ideas. We begin with
projection and anchoring.
Projection is a mental process akin to attaching a mental image to a physical struc-
ture. When we project onto an object, whether kinesthetically or visually, we experience
ourselves intentionally augmenting the object. The object anchors our mental image,
and successful projection requires spatially or temporally locking the projected image
onto the anchoring structure. In the case of visual projection, the easiest form of pro-
jection for sighted people to understand, the image to be attached must be the right
size and be connected to a specific location on the external structure.
When we imagine an object, we again are dealing with mental images but we do not
attach them to anything in the external world. Imagination has no physical anchor,
and imagined images need have no specific size or location.
By contrast, whenwe perceive an object, we are not imagining or projecting anything.
Our experience is of an external object or scene that is supposed to be really there. In
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Fig. 4. The differences between perception, projection, and imagination can be understood as that between
seeing the X and O marks on a grid, projecting an image of X and O onto a blank grid, and imagining X and
O on a blank sheet of paper, or forming a mental image of the board and marks while blindfolded. Subjects in
the experiment described shortly were tested in the projection and imagination conditions only. They played
by calling out moves using the cell numbering system shown.
veridical perception it is. Perception produces the highest-resolution experience and
varies far less among fully sighted subjects than does the vividness of imagination and
projection, which varies greatly.
As shown in Figure 4, the difference between projection, imagination, and perception
can be represented by three conditions in which subjects might play a tic-tac-toe game,
the domain inwhichwe experimentally explored the idea of projection and imagination.
—Perception. Subjects see the actual inscriptions of X and O on a board. Games are
played in the ordinary way, by making marks. The complete state of the game is
explicitly represented by the placement of X’s and O’s and visually evolves with play.
No memory of past moves is required since it is on display.
—Projection. Subjects see only a blank tic-tac-toe grid and have to mentally augment
the grid with moves. The grid never changes no matter how many moves are taken.
Everything has to be remembered by the subject, but the grid might help structure
or support visual recall. Projection is like augmenting reality.
—Imagination. Subjects see a blank page. To play the game they must imagine all
moves. There is no grid to help support or scaffold their visual recall. They can play
the game in this condition either blindfolded or looking at a blank piece of paper.
Imagination, at its best, is like creating a virtual reality game.
In Kirsh [2009b], the results of running 24 subjects playing tic-tac-toe in the projec-
tion and imagination conditions were reported. There was no perception condition since
it was assumed that if subjects recorded their moves they would perform at ceiling.
To play the game, all subjects first learned to name cells using a 1–to–9 numbering
system, as shown in Figure 4 for the 3× 3 board, and a 1–to–16 system for the 4× 4
board. To play the game they called out their move after hearing their opponent’s. To
test for visual imagination capacity we administered the standard vividness of visual
imagery test (VVIQ II) beforehand.
The results were not simple. Subjects did not play tic-tac-toe with better speed
accuracy in any 3× 3 condition. This was not what we predicted. Having a grid to
anchor projection did nothing in the 3× 3 game where one rarely needed to recall more
than 5 or 6 moves.
To challenge the subjects, we then taught them to play 4× 4 games. In this condition
the visual memory load is much greater and we found that having a grid appears to
facilitate all subjects, but the effect is strongest among subjects with lower visualization
capacity. As predicted, the grid now appears to serve as an understructure or scaffold for
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Table IV.
Mean Time Per Move
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0
1
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9
10
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Blank XO   Grid !"#$% XO Grid
4.7 4.6 4.8
10.7
9.5
9.1
4 by 4: Mean Time Per Move
Weak Strong
Visualization Ability
Blank XO Grid Blank XO Grid
14.1
11.6
10.4 10.1
9.4 9.3
In 3× 3 games there were no significant differences between conditions. In 4× 4 games mean performance
was significantly better in the grid condition than in blank (mean difference = 1.6s, p = .002). When
subjects were binned into weak and strong visualizers it was clear that strong visualizers benefited less
from a grid to project to. Strong visualizers grid > blank = .8s, p = .625; weak visualizers grid > blank =
3.7s, p = .014.
projectingmoves. The effect was divided, though. For weak visualizers the grid strongly
enhanced performance. By contrast, strong visualizers only trended to perform better
with the grid. As shown in Table IV, in 4 × 4 games there is an interaction between
mental imagery ability and the usefulness of the grid. Evidently, if a subject can play
the game well in her imagination she gains little from projecting to a blank grid.
Although our experiment should only be seen as a pilot study (n = 24 overall, with
n = 6 strong visualizers, n = 6 weak visualizers), the implication, we believe, is that
at some point, when a spatial memory task becomes hard enough, everyone benefits
from external structure. Hence we predict that even good visualizers will benefit from
a grid if they play tic-tac-toe on 5× 5 boards.
The relevance of this finding to marking is that if a movement is easy to learn
then marking may not help dancers “visualize” the movement any more accurately
than mental simulation. Only if a movement is hard to learn would we predict that
marking facilitates projection by enabling dancers to bring to mind movements that
are more detailed or precise than they can mentally simulate while lying down. This is
consistent with the findings of Cross et al. [2009] andWilliams andGribble [2012]. Both
found that subjects who simply observed other people performing a dance movement
were able to learn that movement comparably to those practicing the movement full-
out themselves. Notably, the movements they studied were simple steps forward or
sideways, unlike the dance phrases we studied, and the movements were learned in
response to an on screen prompt. This suggests their learning task was easy and the
memory requirements much weaker than either tic-tac-toe or learning whole dance
phrases.
4.1. Marking as a Mechanism to Support Projection
The conjecture we have offered is that marking is a better way for dancers to practice
than mental simulation because the act of creating an external movement provides
a physical anchor for the dancers to project their full movement onto. This physical
anchor carries some of the weight of imagination and helps dancers to think more
effectively about aspects of their movement that they are trying to improve, recall,
or practice. When dancers mark they sketch a movement schematically but have in
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mind the real or ideal thing. They accomplish this feat either by projecting on top of
marked movements or by using marking as a mediating structure to facilitate mental
simulation in some as yet unexplained way.
There is little hard proof we can provide that establishes that marking supports
projection more than by analogy with our tic-tac-toe experiment at present. There are
some further analogies to be found occurring in natural contexts, however, that may
show the prevalence of this sort of phenomena.
In music practice keeping the beat by tapping one’s foot is a plausible analog to
using a blank tic-tac-toe board. When musicians tap, arguably, their tapping serves as
an anchor for projecting the musical rhythm to be performed. Musicians report that
when they tap it is to provide them with a stable pulse to help them stay on track
while thinking about the musical rhythm they must play. Tapping serves as a support
structure because it is thought to be caused by an internal oscillator [Eck et al. 2000].
that is sufficiently automatic to liberate higher motor planning centers to work on
different, but coordinated, sorts of actions: the rhythmically more complicated musical
rhythms that are played “on top of the beat”. Because the oscillator is autonomous
it behaves like an external resource, like a tic-tac-toe grid, that can be leaned on.
For complex rhythms it may help a performer to stay in time. Foot tapping may be a
dynamic analog in the sound domain to visual projection in the visible domain.
Orchestral practice provides another example of dynamic projection, this time tied
more directly to marking. When a conductor gestures to his ensemble, carrying the
beat with the dynamics of arm and baton, he is doing more than simply embodying or
displaying beat. He is marking the piece. His arm and gestural dynamics direct each
musician to attend to specific musical features: crescendo, counterpart, entry moments,
etc. These movements cue performance. But they obviously are not the same full-out
thing that performers do. The conductor does not play any notes. He does not use a
bow or blow or strike drums. All the information encoded in his gestures is sparse
and aspectival. But by marking the music he provides performers something they can
work off of. The conductor’s animation anchors projection; it anchors performance.
Conducting is so natural and useful we can readily believe that players themselves
might run through their own part conductor-like, stressing aspects of their music,
using gesture and voice rather than through full-out performance on their instrument.
A final case of gesture anchoring projection, this time a purely internal form of
projection, is found in studies of mental abacus. Frank and Barner [2012] studied el-
ementary students in Gujarat, India. The students were taught to add and multiply
using an abacus and, once proficient, were then asked to perform calculations without
using an abacus. The practice is known as mental abacus because the students still
use an abacus to calculate with, though it is an imagined abacus and their manipu-
lations of it are also imagined. When students work on their mental abacus, however,
they almost always flick their fingers, marking-like, partially miming the action of
moving the beads. When they are not permitted to use their hands, their performance
suffers [Frank and Barner 2012, Hatano et al. 1977]. This suggests that gesturing is
not simply an epiphenomenon, that is, an unnecessary accompaniment to the mental
operations that do the real work. Hand motions seem to improve mental simulation.
The mechanism is possibly much like marking in dance. By imperfectly simulating
moving beads on a physical abacus, the students help to create and transform mental
structures. They project from their own gestures.
4.2. Marking as a Trick for Directing Attention to Aspects of a Movement
Although our dominant hypothesis about marking is that it supports projection, it may
also perform a further function: it may help subjects manage their attention during
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practice. Marking “keeps the dancers honest”. It helps them to focus on aspects9 of
their movement one by one, methodically practicing aspects that would otherwise be
easy to overlook when simulating the movement mentally.
For example, we found that in the mental simulation condition dancers were espe-
cially bad at remembering details, that is, knowing what to do at a detailed level with
fingers, head, and feet. Marking might help because if it functions as a type of interac-
tive sketching with the body, then whenever they mark the dancers will have to keep
in mind the target body part(s) they are sketching. By focusing on specific parts they
may avoid ignoring details.
This tendency to fixate attention on details of a movement may also explain why
marking is better than full-out practice. When dancers practice full-out they execute
all aspects of a movement at once. It is not possible to work on timing while ignoring
the shape of the movements, or work on spatial extension while ignoring dynamics
unless these other components can be run on auto-pilot while the dancer thinks about
a different aspect. This is bound to be difficult because there are interactions between
aspects that make it hard to ignore most aspects when danced at once. When marking,
by contrast, dancers are allowed to practice piecemeal, working on this part or that,
this aspect or that aspect, in a manner that is guaranteed to be unaffected by other
elements precisely because the other elements are not being executed at the same time.
The idea that performing an external action may be a cognitive strategy for helping
to manage attention has been discussed before. In Kirsh [1995], and later in Carlson
et al. [2007] experiments were discussed in which subjects were asked to count images
of items laid out on a page. In Kirsh [1995] the items were nickels, dimes and quarters,
and the task was to provide the total dollar value present; in Carlson et al. [2007] the
items were asterisks and the task was to count the total number present. Both studies
found that finger pointing leads to improved performance. In Carlson et al.’s study,
it was observed further that head nodding occurred and led to similar improvement.
One reason pointing is useful is that it might help a subject keep track of what was
last counted. Our fingers, unlike our eyes, stay put unless intentionally moved. Eyes
saccade relentlessly. Multiple fingers, moreover, can keep track of multiple locations,
the last nickel, dime, and quarter counted. The relevance of such studies is that they
remind us that bodies have different properties thanminds. Theymove differently, they
obey a different principle of inertia, and so they are a resource that can be harnessed to
help solve complex problems. In the case of dance, pointing and dance they are useful
for helping to manage attention.
5. WHY INTERACTING IS BETTER THAN OBSERVING
A few years ago it would have seemed unnecessary to ask whether practice is necessary
formastery: whowould think that watching can substitute for doing? But three theories
taken together now make that question worth asking: (a) the common coding theory
[Prinz 1997], that is, the idea that motor and visual perception share a common world-
oriented code; (b) motor resonance theory [Agnew et al., 2007], that is, the idea that
9A dancer may fixate on any part or attribute of a movement. Laban movement analysis codifies these
aspects into the major categories of body, effort, shape, space. Body – which parts are moving, connected
or influenced by others, total-body organization; Space – motion in connection with the environment, and
with spatial patterns, pathways, and lines of spatial tension; Effort – dynamics, qualitative use of energy,
texture, color, emotions, inner attitude, often reduced to float, thrust, glide, slash, dab, wring, flick, and press;
Shape has static forms: pin-like, ball-like, wall-like, pyramid-like, screw-like, it has flow forms depicting how
the body changes shape during movement, and it has shape qualities: rising/sinking, spreading/enclosing,
advancing/retreating. More macro relations include phrasing and relationships. See Konie, [2011]. All these
can be objects of attention, focal points of thought.
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during observation we activate a motor mirror system where we covertly do what we
see; and (c) enactive perception [O’Regan and Noe 2001], that is, the idea that we
cocreate our perceived environments, so perception is itself a form of action. Today the
question is: When is observing as good as doing? Is it possible that a couch potato might
learn as much about an activity by simply watching it on TV as doing it himself?
It is important for designers to know whether first-hand motor involvement matters
as much as common sense claims. If, for instance, it turns out that we can learn to
cook as well by watching the cooking channel as by real practice in the kitchen then
designers thinking of interactive kitchens of the future will want to use video for
teaching and direction rather than have instructions emanate directly from tools and
surfaces. Alternatively, if working with imperfect models of things is often a better way
to learn complex activity than is regular practice, and hence better than observation
too, then it follows that embedding recipes in tangible things, providing cues for slicing
in knives, hints in spatulas, will be the design of choice, because then tools will focus
attention on aspects of a recipe in a timely way. It may even be worthwhile to embody
recipes in toy models of pots, pans, and eggplants for a quick run through before
full-out cooking. What applies to kitchens applies to hundreds of environments where
pervasive, context-aware computation will become the norm.
The main phenomena that we observed that calls into question the thesis that “ob-
serving is as good as acting” relates to the obvious idea that each of our senses picks up
different information. Even if there is a common code and motor resonance is correct,
it does not follow that visual perception drives as much covert motor activity as actual
movement coupled with kinesthetic perception. Motor planning may be more respon-
sive to kinesthetic factors. Vision provides only a fraction of the information needed
to adapt interactively to rapidly changing forces in our environment or bodies. These
need to be picked up kinesthetically.
To explore this question empirically we studied videos of how our choreographer
works with dancers when creating new movements. One of his favorite methods is
to watch as they solve a choreographic problem and then, when he sees something
interesting, he physically sketches their movement himself. He doesn’t just watch, he
imitates. Then he modifies his sketch a few times and gives them back his own version.
They engage in a physical dialog. But not always. It is quite clear the choreographer
can make his ideas known using words, gestures, or sounds, rather than displays. So,
presumably, on those occasions when he imitates movement it is because it gives him
insight in a way that vision alone does not. See Kirsh [2012b], where this process of
“riffing-off-of-others” is discussed.
Intuitively, it is clear why the choreographer physically appropriates a dancer’s ac-
tion. By performing the movement he can better appreciate the creative possibilities of
a movement. The continuation structure he develops about how the movement might
be carried forward—about where it might go creatively—is different when he is the
author than when he is the observer. And for good reason.
In dance, some phenomenological attributes emerge only when the body is gen-
uinely involved. Consider the experience of internal force, resistance, stretching-to-the-
point-where-it-hurts, or rotating-so-quickly-you-are-just-about-to-lose-control. These
are phenomenologically prominent features that arise when we interact with objects
or work with our bodies. But they are mostly invisible visually. We feel more than we
show. And when as observers we see something subtle we may be misled. For one thing,
people are different in their strength, flexibility, and pain thresholds. An easy stretch
or lift for a dancer may be painful for me. So when I see what looks like a painful
stretch, my sympathetic feeling, that is, my mirror pain, may be unreliable. Moreover,
some body feelings are completely invisible. The feeling a person has just before falling
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or losing balance, for instance, or the amount of resistance being imposed on an arm
motion10, all these are prominent kinesthetically but invisible behaviorally.
This difference in the sensory representation between watching and dancing is, I
believe, one of the primary reasons the choreographer runs the movements of others
through his own body. There is only so much he can know about a movement by looking,
even with his motor resonance system running all out, and with his overdeveloped
expert vision. This limitation is commonplace. For instance, when a potter works on
the wheel, shaping a bowl, there are sensory attributes that can be felt by the hands
that cannot be seen, such as the feeling when the clay is about to tear, or the feel of
the texture of the clay. The potter may feel the “continuation space” of this pot, that
is, the enactive landscape, more effectively and be better positioned to know whether
s(he) can recover from an about-to-tear situation. The hands know things the eyes do
not [Malafouris 2008; O’Connor 2006].
At a more fundamental level each sensory system supports different pathways of
sensory expectation. Events that seem “natural” or obvious in one sensory system may
seem unnatural or completely unobvious in another. Things that are predictable in
one sense, such as, “if I move my arm any further it will hurt” are not predictable in
another. Some things are easy to infer, others are not. Different senses make different
attributes explicit, obvious, such as “I am in pain”.
This is a universal property of representational systems: some properties are en-
coded explicitly; others are more implicit and must be computationally extracted. For
instance, to decide whether the number 30,163 is divisible-by-7 takes some compu-
tation. The attribute divisible-by-7 is not as explicit in the base 10 as divisible-by-10
or being odd. We can instantly tell that 30,163 is not divisible-by-10, and that it is
odd. In the base 7, however, 30,163 is represented as 153,6407, and it is completely
obvious that it is divisible-by-7. It is transparent and explicit. It is less explicit that it
is odd. See Kirsh 1992, 2009d] for an analysis of explicit-implicit representation. Each
sensory system has a coding language that represents some attributes explicitly and
downplays others.
Returning to dance, a dancermay immediately recognize through his somato-sensory
system what level of control is needed to execute a particularly complex move. Visually
this may be unclear. In extreme cases, a movement that the motor system deems
impossible may not seem impossible according to the visual system. The upshot is that
when a choreographer considers how a movement might be continued, his conception
derived from vision may be different than his conception derived from riffing. By riffing
the movement, he physically appropriates it, thereby activating a system of motor
intuitions that are different than his vision-based motor intuitions.
One especially clear example of this is found inWayneMcGregor’s own oeuvre. In the
piece Ataxia, McGregor explored some of the movement space of ataxics, people who
have imperfectmotor feedback. The kinesthetic phenomenology of ataxics is unlike that
of normal subjects. Dancers and McGregor himself worked with ataxics to get a sense
of what it is like to have ataxia. This was not done by watching them alone. It was vital
that they learned to move like ataxics, a process that took some time. By simulating
an ataxic’s body motion, however, both dancer and choreographer gained access to a
different aesthetic. The narrative of the dance,that is, the movement vocabulary the
dance was based on, was derived from familiarity with the kinesthetics of ataxia.
Again, watching was not enough. Indeed, it is quite possible that much of the dance
was “written” more in motor feelings than visual form. Body sense offered a different
basis for aesthetics.
10Resistance is a technical term in dance to refer to the antagonism of muscles when they pull in opposite
directions. Isometric exercises are extreme cases of muscle antagonism.
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One consequence of our research on dance, then, is that bodies are involved in cog-
nition in more ways than motor resonance and common coding. Riffing, in particular,
shows that working across modalities can reshape the conceptualization of something
(e.g., a dance phrase) beyond its origins in one modality, the seen modality. It shows
how the body can figure in extending the range of thought; how our bodies can lead us
to new ideas that are far from the sensory-specific ways we encountered these ideas
originally.
This echoes a widely appreciated feature of human thought, namely, that when peo-
ple interact with external artifacts—representations, instruments, toys—they are able
to learn new things, or understand things more deeply. The physical act of sketching
a familiar object can help us realize aspects of it that we never noticed or thought of
before. Playing with a physical model of something first seen in the movies (a trans-
former toy, for example) can open our minds to some of its deeper properties. It is still
the same object, and we still have the same basic concept of it, but we know more about
it, or see it in a new way. Engaging with it physically helped us learn far more about
it than just seeing someone else play with it. Making and working with models is good
for advancing cognition.
6. EXTENDING EMBODIED COGNITION TO INCLUDE THINKING WITH THINGS
In earlier sections I discussed how tools can be absorbed into the body, how bodies can
be used to model and simulate, and how running ideas through the body that were
first encountered visually can lead to perceiving creative possibilities that otherwise
were hidden from sight and mirror cognition. The next step is to show how things other
than the body and tools can be harnessed and incorporated into the thinking process.
It is to this I now turn. The burden of this section is to expand on the idea of thinking
with things beyond its usual interpretation as computational off-loading, a topic that
I believe has been well covered in discussions of situated cognition [Clark 1997; Kirsh
2009a] and external cognition [Clark 2008; Scaife and Rogers 1996].
My basic line is that thinking, in the sense of drawing inferences, can be done partly
in the perceptuo-motor system and partly by manipulating external things in amanner
that is tightly coordinated with inner processes. Manipulating external things, even
when we do not appreciate it, is a form of simulation. When we interact with an object
our interaction drives our perceptuo-motor system into a state of expectation, and we
tacitly assign probabilities to outcomes conditional on what we might do ourselves.
Thus, in the simplest case, if a subject were to start to upend an object, his action may
begin to unocclude part of it, and he may infer something about the object’s bottom,
or its overall shape, as well as anticipate its appearance just before actually seeing
the bottom. Few theorists would call this form of expectation and pattern completion
a form of reasoning. But formally extrapolation is a type of inductive inference, and
completion is a form of extrapolation or interpolation.
Suppose now that our subject were to do something manipulatively more interesting.
He might, for example, hit the object on the edge of a counter or pour water into it.
These actions were improbable amoment before, and the perceptual input they produce
will have a major impact on the shape of the continuation tree, that is, on the lattice of
possibilities representing what the subject expects could happen. Because of the nature
of some actions, these expectations may have more to do with the causal mechanics
of the object than its shape. An example of causal mechanics might be the effects of
twisting a bottle cap. On the account I am recommending a subject who begins to
twist a cap starts to simulate not just cap twisting but a twisting-off process. As he
proceeds in twisting, his perceptuo-motor system predicts future outcomes, many of
which represent a world where the cap falls completely off the bottle.
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My hypothesis here is that when people think with things they rely on the world
to simulate itself and in so doing they stimulate themselves. They indirectly control
their epistemic state. The world executes part of the reasoning process, therefore, by
carrying them to a new state that is reasoning relevant. Thus, as the thing they ma-
nipulate undergoes change, people revise their continuation system (and their enactive
landscapes). This revision to their continuation space is equivalent to a change in their
enactive perception of what is happening. But mathematically, it is identical to a form
of induction, that is, of learning and reasoning. The result is that if we were to ask our
cap twister whether he thinks that if he continues twisting he will remove the cap, his
answer (yes) looks like it is the product of thought. And it is. But it is not propositional
thought in a classical sense.
On a classical account [Harman 1986] every use of the cap is an experiment, a piece
of data to be assimilated through induction, deduction, or abduction. A person has
an internal hypothesis concerning how the world is and the effect that twisting will
have on the cap. He tests the hypothesis by experimenting with the cap. Beliefs are
revised and new opinions come to the fore. This whole process makes no reference
to changes in perception, conception, or skill. Perception serves as a pass-through of
the world state. The result is that a propositional representation of the world suffices,
and reasoning becomes the same old classical idea of rules operating on propositional
representations11, something not far from the language of thought [Fodor 1975].
By contrast, when our thinking subject infers something he will often be reporting
an expectation encoded in his continuation system. A lattice of continuations is not a
propositional representation. Inner simulations of scenarios can reshape this continu-
ation system. On those occasions where he cannot simulate the future well internally,
or if there is too much uncertainty in how he thinks things will unfold, he can reach
out and begin twisting the cap, that is, perform an outer simulation. Unlike Harman
[1986], this is not equivalent to performing an experiment. It is to cause a revision in
his continuation set. The new input alters the enactive landscape he cocreates.
The bottom line is that physical thinking is an external version of the idea in embod-
ied cognition that much of our cognitive life depends on internal simulation of things.
In the embodied literature, simulation is internal. I have argued here and elsewhere
that we can expand this notion. If internal simulation counts as thinking why not also
count external simulation as thinking [Kirsh 2010]. And if that seems too extreme
then at least we should allow the coordination of internal and external processes to
be thinking. It is simply a matter of cost whether to simulate inside with images and
ideas or to simulate outside with real things, but in a controlled manner.
I believe that developing this view—that literally we think with things—will have
major implications for how designers come to understand interactive objects and sys-
tems.
7. CONCLUSION
HCI is at a crossroads. We are entering a new world of physical, natural, and tangible
interfaces. We can interact with digital elements by gesturing and body movement, by
manipulating everyday objects, and even by training brain activity to control interfaces.
To understand the design principles of such a world requires that we become familiar
with the ongoing developments in embodied, distributed, and situated cognition, and
build closer relations to their research agenda.
In this article, we explored the idea of tool absorption and how our internal repre-
sentation of personal and peripersonal space adapts to manipulables in our hands and
11However, see Johnson-Laird [1989] for a model-based approach to propositional reasoning that relies on
structural elements that need not themselves be components of a proposition.
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wearables on our feet and body. There are open questions about how far we can extend
our action repertoire through tele-presence and remote actuation, and how far we can
push our perception beyond its normal semantics. Is it possible to control actuators
that have dozens of separately articulable fingers in a wholly natural way, that is,
absorb them into our body system? What is the mapping function between our own
action repertoire and “tool” created repertoires? I introduced the notion of enactive
landscapes to define the cocreated actionable environment that we perceive, Gibsonian
style, in terms of what we can do. But unlike Gibson we included tool-supported actions
as part of our action repertoire and hence ways we can alter our enactive landscape. To
an agent, the world is a constellation of intersecting, overlapping enactive landscapes,
engendered by the tools in hand and the resources nearby. When a tool is picked up
or let go there is a change in capability that leads to a change in the enactive land-
scapes that are active. Because tools alter our action repertoire, they shape both our
perception and conception of what is present to be acted on. With further development
this idea may have useful application in understanding how digital interactivity will
reshape our sense of what we can do.
I think it is fair to say that the view that tools modify our perception, conception, and
even our bodies is one that the HCI community has accepted in one form or another for
some time, though without adequate empirical and theoretical support. This support
is starting to arrive. We also need theory and empirical support for a more modern
conception of our bodies and what they are capable of doing. A consequence of our
research on dance is that we have evidence that human bodies can be used for all
sorts of cognitive purposes. In particular, humans use their bodies not just to act on
the world and enact or cocreate a personal world, they use them to represent, model,
and ultimately self-teach. They use their bodies as simulation systems, as modeling
systems that make it possible to project to unseen things that would otherwise be
more inaccessible. These unseen things may be dance phrases that are the target of
learning, or they may be aspects of those phrases that need to be attended to in order to
master the phrase. Dancers also use their bodies to perform analog computation, since
they can rely on the mechanical properties of their bodies to complete trajectories that
otherwise would need to be planned and computed.
We learned further that dancersmake good use of their different senses. For instance,
kinesthetic perception reveals different properties than visual perception, and these
kinesthetic properties, because of the way they are encoded, make it easier to recognize
the validity of inferences that would be near impossible to infer from vision alone, if
one did not also move the body. For our choreographer, for example, we found that by
recruiting his kinesthetic sense he is able to “see” aesthetic properties and narrative
properties of dance phrases that are unavailable through the visual spectrum. He uses
vision to observe his dancers’ work on phrases, but he runs these phrases through his
own body to appropriate them and appreciate their choreographic possibilities.
Given the power of tools and bodies to extend thought it is natural to make the
final step to other objects as things that people can use to think with. The hypothesis
presented here is that much of human thinking takes place in the perceptuo-motor
system or an extension of it. We interact with the world and in so doing we physically
simulate outcomes, or begin to simulate processes that shape our internal expectations
of how things may turn out. This revision of perceptuo-motor expectations is not done
propositionally or consciously. It is a form of implicit cognition and buried deeply in
our perceptual system. But it results in changes in how we mentally simulate the
future. Thus, if someone were to ask us whether sitting on a chair distributes pressure
over the chair’s legs, a thoughtful person might run a mental simulation of sitting
down or a mental simulation of reaching under a leg and feeling the weight of the
chair. Alternatively, he might begin the reasoning process by actually sitting down and
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using the resulting changes in his continuation system to make mental simulation
intuitive.
Once we understand the complex coordination between external and internal sim-
ulation, between doing things internally and doing things externally, we will begin to
reach new heights in design, and create a cognitively better world of physical-digital
coordination.
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